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Abstract — Vulnerabilities in both hardware and software 
have exposed them to the lack of managing programs securely 
in the computational environment, giving hackers the means 
to conduct side channel attacks with intention to steal sensitive 
information, including secret encryption keys. Current 
techniques enable attackers to exploit vulnerabilities at the 
micro-architecture level to build side channels. A typical 
example is the use of the Flush+Reload technique in the 
Meltdown attack [1]. This paper proposes the detection of 
malicious loop activities within the Flush+Reload programs 
through the introduction of a new classification technique. 
Most current detection models, approach the side channel 
attacks, by relying on the correlation between attacker and 
victim programs through the use of machine learning 
algorithms. This paper differs from such models. It solely 
analyse the malicious loop activities inside the Flush+Reload 
attack program and does not seek to synchronise victim and 
attacker programs. The model proposed has the ability to 
classify Flush+Reload attacks with a level of accuracy 
approaching 99% for native and 96% for cloud systems 
without increasing the cost of detection in a cloud systems 
above that in native systems.
Keywords — Side-Channel, Flush+Reload, Prime+Probe, HPC, 
Machine Learning, Cloud Computing, Cryptography
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the Internet and, in particular, cloud 
computing on a wide range of mobile and desktop devices 
is growing, with privacy outsourced to the providers of 
cloud service. The result exposes data to a variety of 
threats, making maintenance and security of data for attacks 
increasingly challenging. Cryptography is the most 
important element in maintaining the security of data in 
every state to which it passes while being transmitted, 
processed and stored. Hackers are attracted by the data’s 
vulnerability and seek access to the data by using side 
channel attacks to steal cryptographic components 
including the secret keys. A range of sophisticated side 
channel attack techniques have been put forward. Should 
these techniques succeed, data protection would be 
unreliable to the point where end users would be likely to 
either limit the extent to which they used cloud services or 
abandon cloud services altogether. Recent research has 
shown side channel attacks to be in widespread use, 
allowing attackers to obtain every part of a cryptographic 
key in around one minute on native systems and three 
minutes in a cloud system [2], [3]. A good deal of publicity 
has been given to a number of hacks where large amounts 
of data were stolen by hackers. Cloud service providers 
claim encrypting the data will toughen the tasks of who 
have unauthorised access. These tasks will involve many 
years of brute force attack to identify the encryption key. 
That defence is invalid when the key can be stolen in less 
than three minutes, from within the system itself.
The objective of this research is the creation of a 
knowledge based detection system capable of leveraging 
hardware support to analyse and confine the activities in the 
process with the view to detect malicious processes running 
in user space. It would be necessary for such a system to 
have the potential to mitigate and eliminate threats against 
the security of the cryptographic algorithms. The system 
uses machine learning techniques to detect a Flush+Reload 
side channel attack occurring in user space without relying 
on the victim and the attacker programs synchronisation.
Section 2 of this paper discusses related work both on 
side channel attacks and on countermeasures against them. 
Section 3 illustrates the study’s methodology, while section 
4 discusses the results. A conclusion then ends the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A number of studies have shown it is possible to carry 
out side channel attacks on CPU components and sensitive 
applications through the use of user credentials and 
compromising technologies.
A. Side Channel Attacks
The notion of leaking data was first discussed by
Lampson [4] who illustrated the possibility that the 
weakness of operating systems in protecting memory 
contents could lead to leakage through hidden 
communication channels. The malicious process would 
encode hardware in order to uncover information about the 
target processes. Lampson [5] proposed a protection 
mechanism which relies on program confinements from 
leaking data between two processes. Kocher et al. [6] 
applied side channel attack to modern computer systems 
and processes and demonstrated how sensitive data 
including secret keys could be obtained from a variety of 
cryptographic methods. The exploitation of hardware 
contention begins with CPU components such as CPU 
Cache Memory. Studies have shown the CPU to be the 
resource most targeted by attackers. 
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The CPU cache is the main source of information for 
side channel attacks. In earlier days, L1 and L2 caches were 
targeted by attacks [7], [8], [9] deploying as communication 
channels between attack and victim processes residing on 
the same core. Core migration challenged this method 
through alternation of process assignment [9]. Faster, higher 
bit-rate attacks than L1 were explored. Attentions were also 
given to unified cache L3 across processor cores because of 
its higher resolution with shorter times for recovering 
sensitive information [10]. Rowhammer [11] attacks have 
exploited main memory DRAM as a channel for data 
leakage with a much higher bandwidth.
Main Memory has been exploited as a bridge across 
processes to transfer large amount of data. After practising 
side channel attack on the CPU cache, the researchers have 
found the feasibility of transferring large amount of data 
through DRAM. Gruss et al. [12] used the Flush+Reload 
technique through exploitation of prefetching address 
translation [13] to map virtual into physical addresses. The 
paper [14] proposed a high-speed covert channel of up to 
2Mb/s using a side channel attack across the CPU, without 
memory sharing.
B. Mitigation and Solutions Based Hardware and Software
The developments in side channel attacks have been met
by similar developments. Countermeasures have been put 
forward as a way of counteracting and mitigating side 
channel attacks’ negative impact in real systems.
Earlier research has demonstrated the achievement of 
high resolution [10] and very fast [3] side channel attacks 
through Flush+Reload, which has the potential to exploit 
the system’s page sharing characteristics. This is especially 
acute cross core in cloud systems [9], through LLC. These 
demonstrations of potential vulnerability presaged software 
developers and cloud providers to disable page sharing 
features which were previously their systems’ default 
settings. The work presented in [15] suggested the kernel 
space solution CACHEBAR to give concrete protection to 
pages shared between cross VMs in PaaS. The drawback of 
this approach is performance impairment, and this is 
particularly true in cloud systems. In the drive to free space 
that can be leased to more tenants, cloud providers aim to 
reclaim the maximum possible amount of memory, and this 
creates temporal localities (data and/or resources being 
reused in a small period of time) that impacts on the system 
negatively. According to the work in [3], memory page 
vulnerabilities when using S$A against LLC cache in large 
page settings might enable AES secret keys to be extracted.
Cleemput et al. [16] suggested that compilers could be 
used against side channel attacks if execution time were 
made uniform by transforming code in the in AES 
algorithm. This study, however, suffers from hardware 
requirements, code complexity, portability, and 
performance issues. Crane et al. [17] suggested injecting 
noise into program execution to achieve control-flow 
diversity. This study gave solutions to limitations discussed 
in [16]. However, their solutions are specific to the 
application concerned, cannot be generalised and degrade 
the system performance. Countermeasures proposed by 
other researchers include proposal for a Sanctum protection 
model that flushes the L1 cache while the host OS performs 
context switching [18]. The paper in [19] suggested that a 
Prime+Probe attack could be defeated by flushing L1D/I to 
avoid data dependency.
On the other hand, a number of Profiling-Based 
approaches have been used for side channel attack 
detection. In [20] a statistical analysis to identify cache 
attacks, observing CPU cycles to monitor accessed and non-
accessed cache (miss/hit) attacks was suggested. Briongos 
et al. [21] proposed monitoring for Flush+Reload attacks 
against the AES algorithm, and the study looked at the 
clflush instruction of multiple cache lines in the core of the 
attack. Detecting attacks in that case were mainly driven by 
the collection of CPU cycles. Their findings are is not 
efficient in for real-time systems, as unexpected workload 
may trigger false positives. Machine learning has been 
proposed as a way to reduce the number of false positives 
and thereby increasing the detection efficiency. However 
this require the involvement of more than one feature (e.g. 
CPU cycle).
Hardware-based detection techniques makes use of 
PMU to obtain a greater level of detail so that features can 
be extracted that support higher resolution detections. 
Zhang et al. [20] suggested CloudRadar, which seeks to 
detect signatures and anomalies. Besides, side channel 
attacks, this cloudRadar seeks to detect other forms of 
attacks such as denial of service against CPU caches. HPCs 
also make it possible to use machine learning algorithms for 
the extraction of patterns that have not yet been heavily 
explored. The results are efficient, highly accurate and 
reliable. Payer [22] suggested HexPads as a way of 
detecting side channel attacks by exploiting PMU through 
the use of sensitive events. Thresholds were set for every 
processor in the system by means of the perf tool, which 
makes use of the system proc file to obtain information 
about every running process. The work in [23],
demonstrated that the attackers may hide the PID of the 
attack, thus evading detection when HexPads misses the 
attacker’s PID and fails to monitor their activities. Instead 
of monitoring PID, the proposed system monitors activities 
in the processor core and this would prevent an attacker 
from avoiding being profiled. An additional limitation of 
HexPads is its ability to detect VMs. Our proposed 
technique in this paper detects both malicious VMs and 
native processes at no extra difference in cost.
Allaf et al. [24] noted that side channel attacks rely on 
cache behaviour based on the attacker/target correlation. 
Alam et al. [25] suggested using machine learning to extract 
the patent of the attack using synchronisation to correlate 
attack and target, but no correlation is required by the 
proposed technique since it allows the system to detect 
malicious loop activities occurring inside the Flush+Reload 
program. The computational cost in the host system is 
thereby saved.
III. METHODOLOGY
This work will present the use of a supervised method in 
classifying the Flush+Reload side channel attack and will 
then compare native system and cloud system results to 
show the level of accuracy attained by the classifier in 
efficient detection of side channel attacks for both native 
and VM processes.
A. K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN)
The instance-based algorithm k-NN is a simple
nonparametric classification algorithm that has been around 
for a long time [26]. It may be used in any classification 
task using discrete data but the classification of unseen 
data-sets and regression tasks to predict a continuous label 
relying on datasets based on time series. Each tested data 
class is predicted by measuring test data items’ similarity. 
The classification process conducted on the test data-set 
realised for each class on k closest neighbours. Any set of 
sample data points can be classified according to its 
neighbours’ majority vote. kNN makes use of a search 
engine based on measurement distance functions to find 
from the dataset the closest data items. k-NN has been 
studied for a considerable period of time and a number of 
distance measures have been used, with the most popular 
being: Euclidean; Manhattan; Hamming; and Minkowski. 
This study has made use of the Manhattan measure to find 
the best k instance for the classification tasks in the training 
data-set.
(1)
Optimal k values are found on the basis: larger values 
mean better classification. Since this approach is not 
reliable, this study uses the cross-validation (CV) [27] to 
determine how optimised the k value is. Cross-validation 
divides datasets into a number of predefined data-sets 
before feeding them independently to k-NN during training 
and testing tasks. The optimal k value is selected by the 
search engine from a number of independent predefined 
data-sets.
The k-NN algorithm measures distances between data 
items in the data-set. This is why k-NN has been chosen; 
the choice of data set rests on data sample similarities with 
stress on features that are near neighbours. The features 
chosen for this experiment include L1, L2 and LLC cache 
misses, because Flush+Reload attacks work by flushing a 
specific memory address from all levels of cache – that is, 
L1, L2 and LLC – and, after a very short sleep, accessing 
the memory address that was flushed. Three consecutive 
cache access points are needed; the memory access 
instruction generates an identical number of hardware 
events, which in this case are cache misses, for each cache 
level. k-NN is looking for data items with the smallest 
distance between them, and so identifies efficiently the 
malicious loop inside the Flush+Reload program.
B. Method Evaluation
When the classifier has predicted unseen data sets, its
accuracy is evaluated to test how sensitive and precise it is, 
and how specific it is in identifying malicious activity. 
Those three characteristics – sensitivity, specificity and 
precision – are plotted along a Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC was put forward by 
[28], [29] to enable the performance metrics of a predictive 
model to be examined in visual form by drawing line 
graphs connecting sensitivity and specificity. A point on the 
curve will signify a ratio between 0 and 1. Since the 
halfway point on this curve represents a random guess, the 
diagonal connects the points (0.5,0.5). Anything above that 
diagonal will be more accurate than a random guess, and 
the actual position enables its accuracy to be characterised 
on a continuum from good to excellent, with the very best 
performance closest to the top right corner. Anything below 
the diagonal is likely to be even less accurate than a random 
guess.
C. Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU):
Programmers need help in debugging and locating the
bottlenecks in their programs and PMU provides this 
assistance with run-time feedback. There is one PMU in 
each processor core of current multicore processors, and 
each has the task of capturing core activities. Each activity 
is recorded as an event and it happens when use of a 
component of the CPU calls for a hardware action. Among 
these events are cache accesses to L1, L2 and L3, and 
branch predictions. There are is detailed Intel 
documentations on events and how they can be used in 
chapter 18 and 19 [30]. For this paper, PMU has been used 
deployed to profile attacker activities in the host operating 
system using the kernel module.
D. Benchmarks
Benchmark suites of programs given by communities
and companies with agreements to be representatives and 
assess the relative performance of a system. They measure 
performance of a piece of code, an application or a system. 
The Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) 
CPU2006 Benchmark suite comprises a number of 
programs each representing a specific program type. For 
example, bzip2 represents compression programs. SPEC 
can be used as a workload to detect and measure system 
performance degradation. SPEC [31] is the benchmark used 
most widely for system performance measurement. In this 
study, we utilise SPEC CPU2006 as a workload on the host 
system in regard to side channel attack with Flush+Reload 
in order to stress the computational environment and to 
evaluate the precision of the detection model.
E. Threat Model and Assumptions
The CPU is a multi-core. Each core has private caches 
L1 and L2 together with a single Last Level Cache (LLC) 
that is shared with other cores. This study examines side 
channel attacks that mostly exploit LLC occurring both in 
native and cloud systems. The assumptions are in native 
systems the attackers are users and in cloud systems, the 
attackers are most likely the Virtual Machines (VM). This 
is particularly the case in the Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS), where guest VMs operate in a virtualised 
environment that enables the sharing of resources such as 
CPU caches.
According to [2], [10], the RDTSC instruction is used to 
attack the timing channel, since it can be accessed through 
user space and does not require any privileges. This enables 
the attacker then observes the target program’s use of 
shared resources. For side-channel attacks, this study 
focuses on Flush+Reload, a memory cache side channel 
popular in today’s computer systems.
F. Experiments Setup
This section describes the software and hardware
components for the experiments involving online and 
offline observations with a view to detect attacks.
1) Hardware Specifications: The experiment was
conducted on HP Proliant DL360 G7 with Intel Xeon 
X5650 2.66GHz processor with 16 GB RAM running 
Ubuntu 14.04. The various tests used SPEC cpu2006.
2) Data Collection: Data collection for this
experiment is by HPCs (Hardware Performance Counters) 
that profile the execution attributes of programs for each 
processor core. Events are sampled that would occur in a 
Flush+Reload attack to see whether such an attack is in fact 
in process. Using the available physical PMC counters is 
best; there are seven of them in this experiment, and so the 
PMC has monitored L1, L2 and LLC cache misses in three 
fixed function counters and four programmable counters. 
Profiling automatically counts the number of the selected 
events for all programs assigned to the select processor 
core. Each sample lasts 0.02 µs, the time needed for a single 
iteration of the malicious loop in a Flush+Reload attack. 
The kernel module takes from the profiling loop 4,000 
samples to see whether the attacker program could have 
been running more than once.
3) Data Aggregation: Aggregating mean values
allows the data-set to be fed into machine learning 
algorithms. Aggregation slices the raw data-set into a series 
of subsets, each containing n samples, to generate a new 
time series execution data-set. n samples are combined 
using the mean function, after which their average is taken 
to give a sample representing the malicious process. 
Malicious activities appear in the raw data as consecutive 
samples in the form of time series, but grouped samples 
cannot be handled in one step by k-NN, and so the 
aggregation mean function makes possible the feeding of 
the data-set into the k-NN algorithm so that k-NN can 
perform the classification.
Fig. 1. Detection system overview
G. Detection System Overview
Figure 3 illustrates the detection systems, of which the
general concept is described in this section. Step 1, the 
detection system communicates with the kernel module for 
the collection of data from the PMC counters; the PMC 
counters can only be written to with the kernel’s 
permission. The kernel module profiles processor cores as 
raw data and provide both off-line and online data. Offline 
data is labelled, in step 2, to reflect attack activities and 
prepare training and test data-sets. It is then fed them to the 
k-NN algorithm to build a classifier, in step 3, using a cross
validation method. The online data, on the other hand, is
collected in step 4. Then, in step 5, the data must be pre-
processed to produce a new data-set from the consecutive
attack activities using the aggregation mean function. In
step 6, the new data-set is then fed to the classifier to
predict attack activities in the system in step 7.
IV. RESULT ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
This section addresses the success of k-NN classifier in 
detecting side channel attacks in native and in cloud 
systems. It goes on to discuss how the selected features of 
the k-NN algorithm’s search engine finds in the dataset 
indicators the presence of side channel attacks, if any.
A. Analysis
Figure 2 and 3 illustrate the use of Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC) metrics to quantify the classifier’s 
accuracy in discriminating between two process activities 
that are benign and are normal workloads, and malicious 
loop activities. The classifier’s output is represented as 
ROC curves, which represent the sensitivity and specificity 
calculations at incremental thresholds between zero and one 
across 10 folds when the same dataset is randomly shuffled, 
resulting in each fold having a different spread of the data. 
The Y axis plots the classifier output’s True Positives Rates 
and the X axis plots False Positive Rates. Each fold is an 
individual ROC and is the light blue line. It represents 
detection quality. The solid blue line is the calculated mean 
of 10 ROC curves. The classifier’s stability is shown by the 
transparent blue area representing confidence intervals.
Fig. 2. The distribution of ROC curves in native system.
Fig. 3. The distribution of ROC curves in cloud system.
Three highly relevant features have been chosen to 
illustrate the leverage of k-NN in detecting malicious loop 
activities inside a Flush+Reload attack. They were selected 
from hundreds of events supported by the CPU because the 
clflush instruction followed by a mov instruction to a 
memory address generates the same number of cache miss 
events as the host OS. Using machine learning detects a 
malicious activity in a shorter time than an attacker needs to 
establish covert communication channels.
Figure 2 shows the ROC metric that evaluates the 
classifier’s ability to detect malicious loop activities among 
normal workloads in the host system. Success in observing 
program execution attributes and classifying processes as 
malicious or benign as a measure of the risk of existing side 
channel attack in the system is shown as estimated by AUC 
of ROC. The model identifies the malicious loop in a native 
system with very high accuracy (AUC=0.99 the average of 
10 folds, with zero confident interval). In the cloud, 
however, the same algorithm trained on a data-set that 
captured VM activities was less accurate at predicting 
malicious activities from among other workloads 
(AUC=0.96 Confident interval=0.02). The classifier is 
therefore 3% less efficient at identifying malicious loop 
activities in the cloud than in a native system. This is the 
result of the noise in L1 and L2 cache memories arising 
from the additional translation layer imposed by Structure 
as a Service (SaaS), a layer which for security reasons the 
hypervisor hides across VMs. K-NN’s reliability arises 
because the execution time series is sliced into proper 
window-size segments, confining the malicious loop’s time-
sliced execution inside a Flush+Reload attack.
B. Discussion
The results demonstrate the ability of the k-NN
algorithm to build a classifier that is very accurate in 
identifying malicious loop activities used by the 
Flush+Reload attack in both native and cloud systems. 
Flush+Reload frequently repeats the same task, which is 
organised by executing clflush instruction to a specific 
memory address of interest and then executing mov to the 
same address. When it receives the memory address from 
which to read the contents, mov must retrieved them from 
memory pages because the previous clflush rendered the 
content in hierarchical cache memory at that address 
invalid, and Invalid contents are updated from main 
memory leading to a sequence of hardware events. Cache 
misses at L1, L2 and LLC are the events selected as 
executing two consecutive instructions produces an equal 
number of L1, L2 and LLC cache misses. This sets the 
attack program apart from other workloads as shown in 
SPEC benchmark suite including two integer applications 
(bzip2 and gcc) and two floating applications (bwaves and 
dealII). It is this particularity that enables the k-NN 
algorithm to build a model identifying the malicious loop in 
the computational environment with high accuracy. The 
aggregation mean function corroborates the classifier’s 
reliability by slicing the data-set into a sequence of 
windows of equal size to be searched for samples of the 
malicious loop. The malicious loop is then seen to be 
repeating the same task of flushing and accessing the same 
memory address.
K-NN is a distance-based algorithm using the search
engine to perform classification by finding the closest 
samples in the data-set. These three features (L1, L2 and 
LLC) have the shortest distance which, in native systems, is 
zero. In cloud systems, on the other hand, the noise in L1 
and L2 caches slightly reduces the classifier’s accuracy.
Another advantage found in these results is that the 
profiling can record native and cloud-based activities with 
no difference in cost. The same classifier does not require
training with different data-sets, and the same data-set can 
be used to train the classifier to detect malicious processes 
either in originate in a native or a VM process – but there 
will be a 3% degradation in the classifier’s accuracy in 
cloud settings due to the noise.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has proposed detection of side channel 
attacks through classification by using Hardware 
Performance Counter (HPCs) to record hardware events in 
the host system. What is proposed to be monitored is events 
relevant to a Flush+Reload attack, and these improve the 
accuracy of detection significantly. The paper also put 
forward a new profiling technique to record activities in 
processor cores to which processes are assigned. The 
proposed detection model is not only reliant on the 
relationship between target and attacker programs, but it 
can also detect a malicious VM performing side channel 
attacks with no additional cost compare to the detection of a 
native process. The ROC curve is used to evaluate the 
efficiency of the proposed classifier for the detection of side 
channel attacks. The classifier detects side channel attacks 
in both native and cloud settings with accuracy of up to 
99% and 96% respectively under SPEC CPU2006 
workloads.
However, the proposed method cannot detect techniques 
such as Prime+Probe due to the behaviour of the malicious 
loop inside the program. Also if the function is smaller than 
the number of malicious loop samples, the new data-set will 
be noisier and influence the classification model, causing 
the attacker to be wrongly classified.
The future work will consider the accuracy 
improvement of the classifier in malicious process detection 
for cloud systems. Further work will be devoted to the 
design of a model that can detect other side channel attacks 
and improves the aggregation to avoid the possibility of 
missing some forms of malicious loop activities.
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